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Abstract 
Within maritime logistics the containerised trade market is growing rapidly with the 
uprising of the Far East. European container port competition among the ports in the Le 
Havre-Hamburg range is fierce as they are threatened by a shortage of terminal capacity. 
The port of Amsterdam identified this threat and realised a brand new container terminal, 
the Ceres Paragon Terminal, in 2002. Characterised by a revolutionary concept known as 
an indented berth, served simultaneously by nine ultra modern post-Panamax gantry 
cranes, productivity levels should raised to over 250 picks an hour. Although the odds 
seemed favourable for the new terminal, enthusiasm was replaced by vexation. Three 
years later the terminal has not yet served a single contract client since it became 
operable. And the future does not look bright. Their main Rotterdam based competitor, 
ECT, is planning a take-over that could make or break the future of the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal.  
The objective of this paper is to study if the failure of the container ambitions of 
Amsterdam can be traced back to main port choice criteria or port performance, identified 
in literature.  
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Introduction 
The growth in seaborne trade of containerised cargo has outstripped the growth in world 
trade in general and world economic growth in particular since the introduction of the 
container during the 1950s on the West-East /East-West long haul trades. As we speak 
volumes of containerised cargo are still growing relatively rapidly. More diverse cargo is 
being containerised and export and imports increase on a global scale. The relatively high 
growth rate for the global containerised trade is initiated by the strong uprising for the 
developing and transitory countries with respect to their trade volumes. Within these 
groups of countries Asia is responsible for the highest containerised cargo volumes in 
global trade, nowadays, and determines the containerised trade scene to a large extent. 
The containerised trade sector benefited especially from the strong growth of the Chinese 
economy. To keep up the pace and provide for the necessary capacity and tools to 
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tranship these massive volumes, container ports worldwide should be responsive and on 
guard in order to retain their levels of competitiveness. 
 
The main stakeholders within the container transport chain are carriers, terminal 
operators, port authorities, regional and national authorities, transport companies and, of 
course, the clients, i.e. the shippers of the containerised goods. Government organs set up 
a protocol for port authorities for granting port access and (partly) provide for 
infrastructural development. The actual port control on a daily basis lies with the port 
authority. This organ grants access to vessels and provides infrastructure for terminal 
areas. In return they receive payments. The terminal operators run actual operations on a 
daily basis. A cash flow is generated through transhipment of containers thereby serving 
the carriers. The terminal and carriers usually work according to contractual agreements. 
The containers find there way to and from the hinterlands through continental transport 
companies. The relationships between the main stakeholders are summarised in Figure 1. 
In this article, the emphasis will be on the three stakeholders that are directly involved in 
the money flows; the port authority, terminal operators and carriers. 
 
XXX INSERT FIGURE 1 XXX 
 
In Europe, the leading container ports showed a last year’s increase in container 
throughput of approximately 15 percent. Several of the ports located in the European Le 
Havre-Hamburg range are struggling with the enormous amounts of containerised cargo. 
Since terminal capacity and throughput to the hinterlands are under strain on the short 
term competition between the ports, with respect to future growth, increases. New 
projects with respect to capacity increases are deployed by established container ports as 
well as general and smaller ports and port areas, not recognised as container ports. One of 
these ports is the port of Amsterdam, established as an important bulk port but without 
any significant number of container transhipment. 
 
In the middle of nineties the Greek-American stevedore Kritikos, chairman of Ceres 
Terminals Incorporated, appeared as the redeemer of the port of Amsterdam. He would 
establish the ‘container port’ Amsterdam by giving the city the world’s most beautiful 
container terminal, capable of handling at least 650,000 containers a year. He did so, by 
realising the Ceres Paragon Terminal in 2001. 
Giants they are, the nine state-of-the-art cranes of the Ceres Paragon Terminal located on 
the quay at the ‘America’ port, in the western Amsterdam port area. They are rated by 
port technicians as the fastest, most efficient and quietest cranes in the world, able to 
serve container vessels of all sizes, including the ‘post-Panamax plus’ container vessels. 
According to plans, approximately 300,000 containers should have been transhipped at 
the terminal in 2004, to eventually rise to 650,000 in 2005. As we speak, the terminal has 
not handled a single contractual container yet and finds itself entangled in a hostile take-
over by its giant Rotterdam competitor, the European Container Terminals (ECT) 
[Parool, 2005].  
 
The container ambitions of the port of Amsterdam and the arrival of the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal were based on present market development for the containerised trade sector. 
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At first sight the developments opened up major opportunities. But it became clear in the 
years following that there was more to it than just opportunities for the container 
terminal. The alarming but also interesting situation the port of Amsterdam finds itself in, 
in the absence of client and leading to a great deal of uncertainty for the future, calls for 
an analysis. 
 
This article finds its objective in clarifying causes for the failure of the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal. Container port choice criteria, favoured by the main stakeholders identified 
earlier, create the basis for this article. We will introduce them in the next section. What 
follows in the section thereafter is an introduction on the port of Amsterdam and the 
Ceres Paragon Terminal in particular. In the section on port analysis we utilise the port 
choice criteria as a tool to review the potential of Amsterdam in its favoured role of 
container port. We discuss the future for the container port of Amsterdam in the final 
section. In the concluding remarks we finally arrive at a statement regarding the failure 
for the port’s container ambitions and the Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
 
Port Stakeholders’ Interests  
This section offers a framework for the analysis on Amsterdam’s container ambitions. 
We will start with the introduction on port choice criteria, since these explain the initial 
choice for a particular port. These criteria do not guaranty the continuity of the port, 
however, as there is more to it than this initial choice. Actual port performance will be 
our next point of discussion where we will introduce the topic of delay and waiting times. 
Port performance will depend on terminal productivity and service degree to a large 
extent.  
 
Container Port Choice Criteria 
The routing for a container transport is dependent on the choice of port(s) in the region of 
origin and the region of destination. Nowadays there is a considerable wide choice in 
container ports that are all within the perimeter of these regions. An example is formed 
by the ports in the European North Sea-region (see Figure 2). The North Sea ports in the 
Le Havre-Hamburg range handle a large part of the container traffic to and from the 
European continent. The ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp are the 
largest ports in the region. Shippers and receivers located in, for example, Ludwigshaven 
(Germany), have the choice to tranship their containers, to and from the Far East, via 
different combinations of [Veldman and Bückmann, 2003]: 
• Shipping line 
• Port of call 
• Inland transport mode (train, truck, barge) 
 
XXX INSERT FIGURE 2 XXX 
 
With, say, 20 carriers, four ports of call and three modes of inland transport (though not 
all combinations are relevant) the number of different routings, serving a particular 
region, easily exceeds 100. For routings including a hub-port, focussing on sea-sea 
transhipment, the number of options is even greater.  
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In literature a large set of port choice criteria has been presented [Lirn et al., 2004; Song 
and Yeo, 2004]. These criteria can be classified in four main criteria corresponding to the 
port’s physical and technical infrastructure, its geographical location, its management and 
administration perspective and its carrier and terminal cost perspective. These four main 
criteria hold a number of sub-criteria on port choice. Previous research [Kroon, 2004; 
Lirn et al., 2004; Notteboom, 2002; Song and Yeo, 2004] ranked these with respect to 
importance based on main stakeholders, i.e. carriers, port operators, port authorities and 
shippers. Namely, 
• Handling cost of containers 
• Geographical location: 
o Proximity to main navigation routes 
o Proximity to import/export areas 
o Proximity to feeder ports 
• Basic infrastructural condition 
• Intermodal links 
 
The handling cost criterion is emphasised by the main stakeholders. The degree of 
importance for the rest of the criteria differs slightly among the main stakeholders. 
Intermodal links, for example, are particularly valued by the shippers. The basic 
infrastructural condition is an important port operator aspect. Carriers are more concerned 
with the proximity to main navigation routes as costs vary considerably with deviating 
routes [Kroon, 2004]. 
Extension of the discussion on port choice will eventually lead to a discussion on the port 
of choice’s (and terminal’s) performance. This provides a tool for measurement of the 
quality of the actual transhipment process. It provides a basis for remarks concerning the 
port’s potential, stability and continuity. 
 
Container Port Performance 
Productivity and efficiency are the two most important concepts in port performance, 
especially from the perspective of its main clients, i.e. the shippers and the carriers. 
Productivity of a producer can be loosely defined as the ratio of output(s) to input(s). 
Efficiency can be defined as relative productivity over time or space, or both [Wang et 
al., 2002]. Both are measurements of performance. 
 
The discussion on port choice criteria has demonstrated that the location and cost criteria 
are important in the initial port choice process. Costs and location are not directly, 
although they are indirectly, related to a port’s (and terminal’s) performance. Criteria that 
are categorised under the port’s physical and technical infrastructure and its management 
and administration focus many variables directly responsible for port’s performance 
[Kroon, 2004]. Many of these criteria, however, have been subordinated to the cost and 
location criteria identified by the main stakeholders. Examples are the port’s technical 
structure and vessel’s turnaround time, both sub-criteria, respectively. 
As a consequence from the emphasis on cost and location criteria, ‘bigger’ or ‘busier’ 
does not always automatically mean ‘better’, phrased by the saying King of the hill does 
not always mean prince of ports [Sowinski, 2002]. Ports frequently called by carriers, 
usually corresponding to the very large ports, do not automatically offer performance 
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levels substantially higher compared to ports being less frequently called, usually 
corresponding to smaller, regional ports. 
 
Understanding performance is a concept fundamental to any business. Ports are no 
exception and it is only by comparison between them, with respect to time intervals, cost 
structures and service degree, that performance can be properly evaluated. Ports are, 
however, complex entities with many different sources of inputs and outputs which make 
direct comparison among apparently homogeneous ports difficult. Various port types 
[Langen et al., 2002] and port ownership and organisational structures, existing 
throughout the world, complicate it further. Since our research goal needs a positioning 
of the port of Amsterdam, comparisons between the port and its competitors will be made 
up to terminal level in the section starting hereafter. Before we enter that topic the 
relationship between a port’s performance and vessel’s waiting time will be introduced. 
 
Average Waiting Time for Container Vessels 
The performance of a port, from the perspective of the main stakeholders, directly 
corresponds to the average waiting times encountered by its clients. Important factors that 
contribute to waiting time are the delays in port transit and delays at the (terminal) quay.  
The average waiting times encountered by vessels at a specific port are important for 
economic comparisons of the different situations, as time means money these days. 
Waiting times have a large impact on the total time of the vessel spent in the port. 
Frequent and/or increasing waiting times for vessels calling a specific port can have 
negative consequences for the number of vessels visiting that port, depending on the 
extent of the delay and the port’s (economical) importance. Comparison of the present 
waiting times with forecasted waiting times might help to create a future perspective for 
the port [Temmerman, 2002]. 
 
Costs for bulk transports that are the result of additional waiting times, caused by 
unexpected delays, are relatively low: 1.4 eurocent per ton per hour (t/h) for dry bulk and 
4.5 eurocent per t/h for wet bulk. For container vessels, however, the costs accompanying 
waiting time are much higher since container carriers adapt a line services system; at least 
8.2 eurocent per t/h [CPB, 2003]. Unexpected waiting times can cause maladjustments 
from sail schedules that can lead to negative consequences for later links in the transport 
chain. Moreover, the container transport often concern (expensive) industrial goods. Bulk 
carriers do not adopt a line service, use vessels that are relatively cheap and transport 
relatively cheap goods. 
In its shift from a bulk to a container port, Amsterdam should keep in mind these 
important differences between both cargo forms and the consequences it has for port 
operations.  
 
Reconsidering Port Choice 
When a particular port of choice is not able to offer desired levels of efficiency and 
performance or charges tariffs that are unsatisfactory, carriers and shippers will 
reconsider their port choice. The decision to continue or seize calling that particular port 
is a complex one, however. Costs accompanying a change of preferred port of call have 
to be offset by higher revenues generated with the new port of call.  
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Besides the cost-revenue balance such a change process creates a considerable amount of 
uncertainty as well. If the new port of choice does not live up to their clients’ 
expectations a smooth return to their initial base port will not be easy. As container 
terminal capacity is scarce idle capacity will be seized immediately by others. Carriers 
that want to return to their former base port might end up waiting in line for available 
terminal capacity and risk the loss of past privileges. Carriers and shippers might 
therefore reconsider a possible port shift as uncertainties add up. The power of the 
established terminal operators seems to be considerable therefore. 
 
With a theoretical basis, consisting of port choice criteria, port performance, its 
correspondence with waiting times, and the power of an established port, the port of 
Amsterdam will be analysed in the next section. The section starts with an introduction 
into the Amsterdam port area. From that point it will narrow down to the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal. 
 
The Port of Amsterdam 
The Amsterdam port and its ‘satellite’ ports (Beverwijk, Velsen/IJmuiden and Zaanstad) 
are ranked sixth within the EU with respect to total throughput volume (tons) 
[Amsterdam Port Authority, 2004b]. The port of Amsterdam has established itself in the 
North Sea-region as an important bulk port. Vast quantities of dry bulk are transhipped in 
the port, including goods processed into semi-manufactured products like feed and grain 
products. Besides these important cargo forms Amsterdam is the largest cocoa port in the 
world. 
The port of Amsterdam is one of very few significant ports to be fully entered through a 
lock complex. One of the world’s largest lock complexes separates the North Sea and the 
port’s access canal. It comprises four locks and is operational 24 hours a day. Only the 
largest lock, the North lock, is compatible for the latest generations of container vessels. 
Through the canal, the North Sea-canal, the port area is fully accessible. Figure 3 shows 
the port entrance and lock situation for the port of Amsterdam. 
 
XXX INSERT FIGURE 3 XXX 
 
Although established internationally as a bulk port, the port of Amsterdam hardly handles 
any containerised trade, however. With a trend of decreasing bulk cargoes at the expense 
of increasing amounts of containerised trade the port of Amsterdam has made a disputed 
attempt, with the realisation of the Ceres Paragon Terminal, to enter the container market. 
 
The Ceres Paragon Terminal 
The Ceres Paragon Terminal is realised as a joint project of Ceres Terminal Inc. and the 
Amsterdam Port Authority. Total investments are estimated at €172 million, of which the 
Amsterdam Port Authority invested the larger part, €128.5 million in infrastructure and 
part of the cranes. The remaining part of the investment, € 43.5 million, was made by 
Ceres Terminal Inc.  
In September 2002 the Japanese shipping and transport company, Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
(NYK) acquired the American Ceres Terminals Inc. along with 50 percent of the shares 
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in the Ceres Paragon Terminal. NYK ranks ninth amongst the individual container 
carriers and is a member of the Grand Alliance consortium, holding Hapag-Lloyd 
Container Line (HPCL), Malaysia International Shipping Corp (MISC), Orient Overseas 
Container Line (OOCL), P&O Nedlloyd besides NYK [CI, 2004]. 
 
The terminal area covers 62 hectares, has a total quay length of 1,050 meters and had an 
annual capacity of 950,000 TEU. The terminal introduced a revolutionary and unique 
concept amongst container terminal facilities: A so-called ‘indented berth’ enabled post-
Panamax vessels to be serviced by a maximum of nine gantry cranes, having a reach up 
to 22 containers across deck from both sides of the vessel (see Figure 4). This made it 
possible to enhance productivity to a high standard. 
 
XXX INSERT FIGURE 4 XXX 
 
The indented berth has a length of 400 meters and a width of 57 meters and was designed 
for the latest generation of container vessels; the post-Panamax plus category vessels. It 
also offered a classic quay with a length of 615 meters were a maximum of five gantry 
cranes could be assigned to one vessel. The total berth time of the indented berth is 
accepted to be within 15 minutes [Ceres, 2004]. The terminal, thereby, seems to be able 
to offer a full package of services. 
 
Port Analysis 
Port and terminal comparison between the port of Amsterdam and its direct competitors, 
Rotterdam and Antwerp, although established as massive global container ports already, 
might be interesting to further explicate Amsterdam’s competitive potential. We will 
begin with comparing the main terminals in these container ports, forming the basis of 
the port’s actual performance. The section on port comparison provides feedback on the 
port choice criteria, important in the initial port choice. 
 
Terminal Performance Comparison 
Although not fully proven in practice (some trials were conducted) the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal has a very competitive status when productivity level is compared to the 
competition: the main terminals operating in the nearest global container ports (among 
other large terminals); Rotterdam’s Delta-terminal (operated by ECT) and Antwerp’s 
North Sea-terminal (operated by Hesse Noord Natie). 
With an average capacity of 25 movements per hour for one gantry crane, the capacity to 
load or discharge a container vessel with five cranes can theoretically lead to 125 
movements per hour. With the introduction of the indented berth concept productivity of 
the Ceres Paragon terminal was to be doubled to at least 250 picks per hour. The cranes 
work independently from to the transport process regarding supply and evacuation of 
containers, as straddle carriers are deployed. Turnaround times (and with that, costs) 
could be reduced to a considerable extent this way, estimated to be in the range of 30-50 
percent.  
The Rotterdam ECT terminal is characterised by having a huge capacity. Productivity per 
berth however, remains relatively low (70 units per hour per berth), with a maximum of 
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five cranes per berth. Productivity of the cranes is also dependent of the productivity of 
the Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) that the Delta-terminal deploys. Antwerp, with 
its not yet (fully) automated container terminals reaches a somewhat higher productivity 
per berth; 110 units per hour per berth, one of the aspects that keep the port competitive, 
besides its favourable prices.  
When productivity levels of the two massive terminals are offset against the productivity 
levels of the Ceres Paragon Terminal the difference is striking. A marginal note must be 
made here. This productivity level for Ceres Paragon is reached with the indented berth 
fully serviced by nine cranes. With another vessel berthed simultaneously at the other, 
classic berth, no more cranes can be assigned to that particular ship. When the nine 
available cranes are divided over both vessel respective productivity levels will be 
reached but will not match the massive number of 250-300 units per hour per berth. The 
other terminals operating the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp have several berths that 
can be serviced simultaneously by a constant number of cranes. Overall productivity for 
the total number of berths can thereby be increased considerably. Productivity levels for 
Ceres Paragon remain striking however. 
Numbers on terminal capabilities are summarised in Table 1 
 
XXX INSERT TABLE 1 XXX 
 
Port Choice Comparison 
Terminal comparison led to a satisfactory number on productivity for Amsterdam’s Ceres 
Paragon Terminal. Container terminals are, however, dependent of a large set of port 
criteria in addition to their independent capabilities. A port comparison between the 
identified ports is therefore a necessity. Port comparison between these ports will be 
based on the main port choice criteria identified earlier.  
 
The three criteria that correspond to the port’s geographical location seem be rated in 
basically the same way for the three ports. The ports are in each other direct vicinity with 
the distance between the two most remote ports, Amsterdam and Antwerp, being only a 
sheer 100 miles. International stakeholders’ perception with regard to proximity to feeder 
ports, proximity to import/export areas and proximity to main navigation routes, seems 
not to differ to a large extent for both ports.  
Although this statement is open to some ambiguity, it is the other important port choice 
criteria on which findings for the ports might deviate considerably: the ports’ 
infrastructural basis, its intermodal linkage and its handling cost of containers. Besides 
these choice criteria, to be discussed next, the ‘political’ role of the main stakeholders 
will make its contribution to the analysis at a later stage. 
 
The port of Rotterdam, positioned among the largest (container) ports in the world, owes 
a considerable part of its status and rank to its favourable geographical location. It is 
centrally situated to the main trunks, either Eastbound or Westbound. It occupies a 
central position with regard to feeder ports throughout the (West) European continent. 
And it finds itself in a highly competitive position when it comes to its closeness and its 
reach, i.e. its intermodal network, to the main European import and export areas [Kroon, 
2004]. The advantageous and competitive outcomes with respect to these three important 
main choice criteria are complemented by high ratings for the other identified choice 
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criteria. The port’s nautical access, as a basic infrastructural condition, is quite optimal. It 
offers an easy and continuous access through a more than sufficient depth. Its intermodal 
linkage is quit optimal as barge, rail and road networks are extensive and of high quality 
standard. Container handling costs are competitive, especially since run-up costs to the 
port are kept low due to the favourable geographical and infrastructural situation.  
Since the port of Rotterdam seems to have acquired an ideal position with respect to the 
choice criteria it will serve as a reference point. 
 
 
Port’s Infrastructural Condition 
The nautical accessibility for the three ports is quite different from each other. The port of 
Amsterdam is characterised as a lock system port as is the port of Antwerp is partially. 
As the main container operations with the port of Antwerp are executed in front of the 
lock complex, in tidal river waters, it will not be designated a lock port. The port of 
Rotterdam is directly accessibility from deep water. 
The nautical accessibility, as one of the main issues for the infrastructural basis [Lirn et 
al., 2004; Song and Yeo, 2004], will be discussed next for the port of Amsterdam and 
will be put in perspective with the other ports. Central in this discussion are the lock 
complex and the port’s access canal, the North Sea canal. 
 
The Sea Lock Complex 
A lock system has the advantage of ruling out tidal differences that might facilitate load 
and discharge operations. It offers a continuous 24 hour port access. It is disadvantages 
that dominate the conversation, however. Load and discharge problems that accompany 
tidal differences are mainly caught up with by today’s technology being applied in quay 
cranes etc. The disadvantages that accompany a lock complex are not ruled out that 
easily.  
What follows is an overview of the bottlenecks that might be encountered with 
Amsterdam’s lock complex in case of increasing inbound and outbound flows of cargo: 
• The vulnerability of the lock system 
o The risk of encountering damage upon entering the large North-lock depends on a 
combination of wind force and direction. A negative advice is given when wind 
forces exceed six Bft. and wind blowing from another direction than parallel to 
the lock. Container vessels in particular are vulnerable to wind force and direction 
as their draft-height ratio is low [Svitzer Weismuller, 2004] 
o Unexpected jams in the lock complex, in particular jams in the North lock that 
forms an obligatory link for the large vessels that have a destination beyond the 
lock [CPB, 2001]. 
• The dimensions of the vessels calling the port of Amsterdam [CPB, 2001]:  
o The Middle Lock is characterised by a beam restriction, which can only handle 
vessels of well below Panamax dimensions, leaving the North lock as the only 
option for a majority of the Deep-Sea vessels calling at the port. 
o With the inevitable arrival of a new generation of vessels, the dimensions of these 
vessels, with respect to length, beam and draft, might be beyond the dimensions 
of North lock. 
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o The outport at the sea-side of the lock complex has been assessed too tight to 
grant an easy manoeuvring for large vessel. 
• The lock process: 
o Liner vessels plan port calls as far as three months ahead. Bulk carriers usually 
make an unannounced call only 12 to 24 hours before arrival. This could lead to 
possible additional waiting times for liner shipping [Amsterdam Port Authority, 
2004a] 
o The lockage times (including waiting times) at passing [CPB, 2001] 
 
At a certain point in time, heavily depending on the future development for the port of 
Amsterdam and, until recently, the success of the Ceres Paragon Terminal, the maximum 
capacity of the lock complex will be reached. The waiting times at the lock complex 
might increase exponentially from that point [CPB, 2001]: Estimates of total cargo flows 
for 2020 destined for the port of Amsterdam, under the current lock complex, vary from 
64 to 73 million tons (including container traffic). The large difference (14%) between 
these estimates, however, might have a doubling effect on waiting times; from 165 
minutes to 330 minutes [Koopmans, 2003]. These times reflect total waiting times, 
including delays encountered with the lock processes but also possible waiting times that 
stem from problematic passages at the North Sea canal, to be discussed in the later on this 
section. 
As a result of congestion at the lock complex liner vessels will take evasive measures. 
This will lead to stagnation of the volume growth for the Amsterdam port area. The first 
to make evasive manoeuvres, involving extra costs, are the container carriers as they 
experience the highest costs that accompany waiting times. Moreover, a considerable 
amount of cargo might head for foreign destinations, through which additional loss of 
prosperity for the Netherlands might be encountered.  
 
The outlined waiting time problem that might originate from an extra pressure on the 
North lock and possibly leads to congestions seems to arise especially with an increasing 
number of container vessels. The construction of an extra lock is apparently an important 
edge condition for the future success of the container ambitions of Amsterdam and the 
Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
Although it will not offer a solution to all the problems outlined above, an additional new 
lock would have the following significant benefits [Drewry, 2003]: 
• It allows the port of Amsterdam to grow its traffic volume as cargo projections 
indicate negative growth with the current infrastructure. 
• Increase of the number of usable locks (i.e. usable by modern commercial Deep-Sea 
vessels) from two to three, which would provide sufficient capacity to accommodate 
increasing cargo volumes and associated vessel activity. 
• It permits two or even three vessels to transit simultaneously in the new lock, thus 
helping to constrain lock operating costs, and further increase lock capacity. 
• It makes the capture of significant container traffic volumes more feasible by 
reducing or even eliminating potential congestion at the locks. 
 
In a research report prepared for the Dutch Ministry for Transport, Drewry Shipping 
Consultants [2003] arrived at some interesting numbers when the current lock situation is 
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compared to a situation with an additional lock; Forecast developments with respect to 
average container vessel size calling the port of Amsterdam in 2020, show an average 
size of 4,223 TEU versus 5,698 TEU for both scenarios respectively [Drewry, 2003]. The 
present lock has dimensions that allow the latest generation of container vessel. The 
margins are very small, however. The dimensions of the projected new generation of 
vessels will not be able to pass the lock. Stagnation of the average size of a container 
vessel will be encountered eventually without a new lock, therefore.  
The assumption made here, is that major customers are to be won with the introduction of 
a new lock. Dependent upon the lock infrastructure provided, new lines will be won that 
are active in the two European East-West trunks (i.e. to Asia and to North America) and 
that there will also be some additional North-South trade traffic as well. The capture of a 
main Europe-Asia trade service would be a potential catalyst for a broadening of the 
services using the port, due to the generation of inter-line possibilities.  
 
A decision concerning a new lock has been postponed. Costs are high, as they are 
estimated to be between 450 and 550 million euro. The central government, one of the 
main stakeholders with respect to this issue, is not yet convinced of the necessity of a 
new lock. The construction of a new lock will not be started with on a short notice. In 
addition to this infrastructural bottleneck another might present itself when the number of 
ship movement to and from the Amsterdam port area rises. It has to do with its access 
canal; the North Sea canal. 
 
The North Sea Canal 
As the canal has limited dimensions the influence of wind, water displacement by the 
vessels and the (few) turns in the canal, might lead to problematic ship passages. This can 
lead to additional waiting times. The number of problematic passages nowadays is still 
acceptable, being restricted to some meetings per week [Temmerman, 2002]. With the 
realisation of the Ceres Paragon Terminal container vessels, categorised in the largest 
vessel section, were also expected to call the port on a frequent basis. If decided in favour 
of the new lock, more and larger vessels should be able to call the port. For this reason it 
was expected that the probability of difficult, or even impossible, passages on the North 
Sea canal would increase in the future.  
Some suggestions, to control or overcome these North Sea canal limitations, have been 
put forward therefore [Temmerman, 2002]: 
• Broadening of the canal: The North Sea canal has a bank relating 1 to 3 that 
confiscates 100 meters of the width of the waterway, since to total surface width is 
270 meter and the canal’s fairway comprises only 170 meter. When ‘dam walls’ are 
created at the edge of the banks and the banks are dug off to a depth of 15 meters or 
beyond, a waterway arises that is 270 meters wide instead of current 170 meters. This 
could be applied particularly at ‘turning points’ of the canal. The disadvantage of 
these dam walls is the reflection of waves that might have negative consequences for 
the vessels sailing the canal. 
• Limitation of wind: Since the vessels sailing the North Sea canal seem sensitive to 
wind a solution might be found in the placement of wind awnings alongside the canal. 
Again, particularly at the turnings. The transverse winds will have less influence, in 
the form of drifting, on particularly the larger vessels. 
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When no measures are taken, serious nautical access obstructions for sea shipping was 
expected by the year 2010. These will definitely have consequences for the international 
competitive position of the port as waiting times will be raised to an unacceptable level. 
To offer an acceptable port waiting and transit time, the Amsterdam port area should 
consider its options. 
 
The disadvantages that accompany the nautical accessibility stand in strident contrast to a 
(tidal) port such as Rotterdam. A direct, deep water connection to sea, however, does not 
always mean a win-win situation as is the case for the port of Rotterdam. The port of 
Antwerp, for instance, experiences severe problems when it comes to tidal differences as 
the port’s nautical entrance, the Westerschelde, is characterised by shallow waters at low 
tide. Vessels have to follow strict procedures to enter the port of Antwerp to prevent 
running aground, thereby experiencing additional waiting times. Transit times may add 
up to 6 hours before a container vessel berths. It might be expected that this problem will 
be solved in the future, however. Due to recent agreements between the government of 
The Netherlands and Belgium, the Westerschelde will be dredged and as a result will be 
made more accessible for large containerships [NRC, 2005]. 
Table 2 gives an overview of numbers with respect to nautical accessibility, as it forms 
the main aspect with respect to the port’s infrastructural basis, and the accompanying 
vessel transit times. 
 
XXX INSERT TABLE 2 XXX 
 
The infrastructural bottlenecks discussed for the port of Amsterdam, however, can not be 
held solely responsible for the failure of the Ceres Paragon Terminal. Current lock 
capacity is still more than sufficient and problematic passages were expected only 
extreme cases and with higher numbers on traffic. Container vessels can safely call the 
port of Amsterdam the first years. When realistic predictions of future problems arise, 
instead of the current scenarios being sketched, enough time will be granted to decide on 
further developments of the nautical accessibility. Lock capacity, however, needs 
primacy here, as the presented problems with respect to the canal find are based on 
intangible simulation studies. They need not to be rejected or neglected for that though.  
 
Intermodal Linkage 
The lock process and the North-Sea canal transit create some levels of uncertainty with 
respect to transit times. These are however, not fully insuperable. So there must be other 
reasons that have led to the failure of the Ceres Paragon Terminal. Some doubt the 
capabilities of the port of Amsterdam with respect to hinterland connectivity. 
 
Truck 
The port area is situated right on the A10 and A9 motorways, an area that is characterised 
by congestion on a regular basis. These congestions are not solely applicable to the 
Amsterdam area. A large part of the Benelux’ road network is characterised by heavy 
traffic and congestion, as is also the case for the Rotterdam and Antwerp port areas. 
Some carriers are foreseeing difficulties, however, for the road connection(s) between 
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam, characterised by frequent and major congestions [Rotterdams 
Dagblad, 2004].  
Plans have been presented for improvement of the road system in the Amsterdam port 
area. The ‘Westrand’-road will be a new connecting road between the ‘Coen’-tunnel 
(A10) and the A4/A9 highways. The first part of the road (designated A5) opened 
November 2003 and connects the A4, along Schiphol Airport, with the A9. With the 
construction of the remaining part, planned for the ‘Westrand’-road (between the A9 and 
the port area), Schiphol Airport Amsterdam will be accessible within 15 minutes. The 
second part is planned to be delivered in 2008. The ‘Coen’-tunnel, a known bottleneck, is 
to be widened. The number of lanes will increase from four to eight. Two of those will be 
rush hour ‘exchangeable’ lanes with the possibility of offering five lanes in the busiest 
direction. This second ‘Coen’-tunnel will be finished in 2010 [Amsterdam Port 
Authority, 2004a/b]. 
As other port areas are also characterised by heavy traffic and frequent congestion, 
hinterland connectivity by road was therefore not directly a factor that stood in the way of 
success for the Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
 
Train 
The port of Amsterdam is properly served with railway connections. These make the 
European hinterlands fully accessible. The port has its own marshalling yards and 
connections to main railway systems. There is a Rotterdam-Amsterdam shuttle with an 
international rail connection to Belgium, France, Switzerland and beyond. A certain form 
of dependency of Rotterdam remains, however. Container transports originating in 
Amsterdam are only indirectly connected to their final international destination as 
transports head for Rotterdam first.  
Amsterdam will shortly connect to the ‘Betuwe’-line at Geldermalsen, however. The 
‘Betuwe’-line is a ‘freight only’ rail shuttle link between Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 
the West (independent of each other), and the German border in the East. 
Hinterland connectivity by rail is not ideal at present day but will be in the near future as 
it becomes independent of the port of Rotterdam. Again, issues on rail connectivity do 
not offer a convincing piece of evidence in the failure of the Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
 
Barge 
Of all goods transport to and from Amsterdam over one third takes place through inland 
barge shipping. The port of Amsterdam connects to the Rhine-river through the 
‘Amsterdam-Rhine’-canal, thereby connecting the city to the European hinterlands. Both 
industrial and consumer markets in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
can be served rather quickly (no obvious congestions), and efficiently (economies of 
scale versus speed).  
The big advantage the ‘Amsterdam-Rhine’-canal has over the waterways connecting 
Rotterdam and Antwerp to the river systems is the absence of current. This leads to 
considerable time and fuel gains. 
 
When the situation for all three modalities added up, it does not form a very convincing 
piece of evidence in the case of hinterland connectivity being an important reason for the 
failure of the Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
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Handling Costs of Containers 
The Ceres Paragon Terminal was not able to attract carriers on a contractual basis. Fixed 
cost, therefore, added up in absence of a frequent and considerable income. As a final 
means to attract customers and to cover a fraction of the costs, the terminal decided to 
offer their services for relatively low handling costs. This port choice criterion was 
identified by main stakeholders in the sector as most important. The tariffs charged by the 
terminal formed only a marginal part of those of competing terminals. It had no effect on 
carriers, however. The cranes of the Ceres Paragon Terminal remained silent.  
 
When we review the port choice criteria for the port of Amsterdam a number of flaws can 
be identified: the lock complex and the North Sea canal having its effect on the port’s 
nautical access, and the port’s intermodal linkage influence on hinterland connectivity. 
None of them seem to lead to such a fatal judgement for the Ceres Paragon Terminal. 
Even adding up the flaws can not fully explain the failure of the terminal as most of the 
flaws are not yet reality and can be overcome in the future. Especially when these are 
contrasted with the terminal’s capabilities and the low handling tariffs charged. 
Other influences must be the main instigator for the failure of the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal. Maybe the position of the competitive container port of Rotterdam, established 
nearly four decades ago and massive in size, offers an explanation.  
 
Port Politics  
ECT, the leading terminal operator in Rotterdam, basically handles all the major carriers 
and binds them through contracts (although Maersk and Sealand have their own 
dedicated terminal). The power that is gained through these contracts might be stronger 
than suspected. A striking example is formed by a situation encountered in last year’s 
October: Carrier APL, frequently calling the port of Rotterdam, chose to call the port of 
Amsterdam as waiting times at ECT, at that moment in time, were not acceptable. The 
Ceres Paragon Terminal discharged 2,300 containers that were transported back, by train, 
to the port of Rotterdam. Due to contractual agreements ECT eventually summoned APL 
to still moor at the port of Rotterdam, even with the all containers destined for Rotterdam 
already being discharged in Amsterdam. 
 
The terminal operator is not the only constraining factor in the process of a possible port 
shift, from Rotterdam to Amsterdam. The container carriers are operating in alliances to 
gain scale advantages and cost reductions. One of the main shareholders of the Ceres 
Paragon Terminal, NYK, is a member of the Grand Alliance. P&O Nedlloyd is also an 
important member of this alliance. It has considerable interests with the port of 
Rotterdam and a strong hand in the alliance. Lobbying attempts by NYK, to draw 
attention to the Amsterdam based terminal, were tempered by P&O Nedlloyd veto rights. 
 
Future of the Ceres Paragon Terminal 
Only one viable option, with respect to the container ambitions of Amsterdam, remains in 
a situation where a take-over by ECT becomes reality; the use of the Ceres Paragon 
Terminal as an overflow for ECT’s terminal operations. But as ECT is planning to 
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increase its capacity by expanding its existing terminal area, chances for Ceres Paragon 
diminish. ECT plans to increase its capacity with 53 percent during the coming 18 
months [ECT, 2005]. Quays and berths have been developed and six gantry cranes are on 
the order book. More cranes, however, are necessary to realise the expansion. Ceres 
Paragon has nine state-of-the-art post-Panamax gantry cranes standing inoperable. It 
seems like a marked opportunity for ECT to obtain these cranes easy, quickly and rather 
‘cheap’. 
 
It is questionable, however, if cooperation between both ports, by using Ceres Paragon as 
an overflow, would not lead to a greater competitive power on the long term. Here 
competitive power as a nation is emphasised, not as a city or sole organisation, thereby 
spreading risk and uncertainties. The port of Antwerp signed a protocol agreement with 
the second Belgian port of Zeebrugge. The two ports entered into a partnership whereby 
they will work together to strengthen their positions in regards to international container 
traffic. In the long term, the agreement may see the two become a single Antwerp-
Zeebrugge port complex [Pethick, 2000]. Projects like these are keeping the port of 
Antwerp competitive with its European rivals.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
With respect to important port choice criteria, the container ambitions of the port of 
Amsterdam seem justified, although a number of problems have to be overcome. 
Especially infrastructural issues with regard to the lock complex, the access canal and 
hinterland connectivity have to be solved but are not insuperable.  
With a revolutionary and highly productive concept, an enormous growth market, a 
forthcoming capacity shortage with competitors, an advantageous geographical location 
and low handling costs, a number of important (success) factors presented itself to make 
things work. The Ceres Paragon Terminal, however, was not able to position itself in the 
North-West container port arena. The economical and political power of the leading 
parties in the massive container port of Rotterdam seems to play a role, either directly or 
indirectly, in the failure of the Ceres Paragon Terminal.  
A forthcoming take-over of Ceres Paragon by ECT leaves open only one viable option 
for the container ambitions of Amsterdam; the use of Ceres Paragon as an overflow for 
ECT’s terminal operations. Such an option, however, seems improbable as ECT is 
planning to increase capacity by expansion of its own existing terminal area. The gantry 
cranes that decorated skies for one and pollute it for another, might trade in the 
Amsterdam sky for the Rotterdam sky on the short term. A long term national 
cooperation between an established and a candidate container port, to face the fierce 
European competitive situation, seems not to be given a chance.  
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Figure 1: Relationships between stakeholders in a container terminal process 
[Wiegmans, 2003] 
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Figure 2: Different routing to one particular hinterland destination  
[Kroon, 2004] 
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Figure 3: The Amsterdam Seaport area and the sea lock complex at IJmuiden  
[Ceres, 2004] 
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Figure 4: Docking situation at Ceres Paragon Terminal Amsterdam [Zanen, 2002] 
 22
 
 
Table 1: Terminal comparison between the main container terminals in Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Antwerp: Ceres Paragon Terminal, ECT Delta-Terminal, North Sea-
Terminal [Ceres, 2004] 
 
 Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp 
Terminal Paragon ECT Delta North Sea 
Operator Ceres/NYK ECT Hesse-Noord Nation 
 Indented Marginal   
Berth length (m) 400 612 4,500 1,200 
Water depth (m) 13.7 13.7 16.6 14.3 
Terminal area (hectares) 54 236 80 
Reefer plugs (units) 433 (850 later) 2,696 660 
Annual capacity 1,000,000 4,100,000 1,500,000 
Main type of operation Straddle Carrier AGV Straddle Carrier 
Gantry cranes 9 25* 10* 
Outreach 22 slots 16-18 slots 18-20 slots 
Productivity per berth (units/h) 250-300 70 110 
Ship cargo operation 24 hours 24 hours 24 hours 
* Being expanded 
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Table 2: Navigation comparison between the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
Antwerp [Ceres, 2004] 
 
 Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp 
Terminal Paragon ECT Delta North Sea 
 Indented Berth   
Operator Ceres/NYK ECT Hesse-Noord Nation 
Length of Waterway     
Pilot station – Lock (km) 16 
Lock – Berth (km) 12 19 122 
Width (m) 275.0  >300 
Acceptable draft (m) 13.7 22.5 14.5 
Water depth (m) 13.7 24.8 14.0 
Time (average, hours)    
Pilot station - Lock 1.0 
Lock transit 0.75 
Lock – Berth 1.75 
2.0 6.0 
Total duration    
Pilot station – Berth  3.5 2.0 6.0 
 
 
 
 
